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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case is on interlocutory appeal from an Order of
the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, State of
Utah, entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court
Judge, denying plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Document.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether the district court
inappropriately extended a privilege, whether based on the
attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity, to prevent
discovery of an agreement that is admitted to be part and
parcel of a commercial transaction that is at issue in the
lawsuit.
PERTINENT STATUTE AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) (1989):
Privileged Communications:
There are particular relations in which it
is the policy of the law to encourage
confidence and to preserve it inviolate.
Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a
witness in the following cases:
* * *

(2) An attorney cannot, without
of his client, be examined as to
communication made by the client
his advice given therein, in the
professional employment; nor can

the consent
any
to him, or
course of
an

attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk
be examined, without the consent of his
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity.
(Remainder of § 78-24-8 omitted.)
Rule 26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to
the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this
rule, a party may obtain discovery of
documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of
this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's
representative (including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of his case
and that he is unable without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or
legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
(Remainder of Rule 26(b)(3) omitted.)
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal presents for review the district court's
error in keeping from the plaintiff, Gold Standard, Inc. ("Gold
Standard"), an agreement that is part and parcel of a
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commercial transaction.

This case involves Gold Standard's

rights and interests in the Mercur Mine, located in Tooele
County, Utah.

Gold Standard has sued Getty, Texaco and Barrick

for tortious conduct, breach of contract, interference with
property rights, and conspiracy.

Gold Standard's claims

against Texaco and Barrick involve, to a great extent, the
transfer of the Mercur Mine from Texaco to Barrick.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The district court has denied Gold Standard's motion
to compel American Barrick Resources Corporation ("Barrick") to
produce an agreement dated June 11, 1985, (the "June 11
Agreement") and signed in counterpart by the defendants. The
June 11 Agreement is, by defendants' own admission, part and
parcel of the arrangement for the sale of the Mercur Mine from
Texaco to Barrick.

It is, therefore, directly relevant to the

claim that the defendants structured the sale of the Mercur
Mine in derogation of Gold Standard's rights and interests.
For two years after Gold Standard filed its original
complaint, defendants represented, without qualification, that
the complete agreement for the Mine's transfer was embodied in
a "Stock Purchase Agreement" dated May 15, 1985. Barrick's
privilege logs, amended at various points from March 4, 1988,
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through February 15, 1989, never disclosed the existence of the
June 11 Agreement.

Barrick's response to interrogatories

indicated that the Stock Purchase Agreement disclosed all
consideration paid to Texaco and contained all terms of the
sale.

See Appendix "A," Response to Plaintiff's First Set of

Interrogatories to the Barrick Defendants, at 26-27, 30,
51-52.

Likewise, not a single one of the key Barrick, Getty,

or Texaco executives involved in the sale of the Mercur Mine
ever admitted the existence of the June 11 Agreement during
their respective depositions.
It was not until the November 18, 1988, deposition of
Mr. Stephen R. Dattels, one of Barrick's principal negotiators,
that Gold Standard learned that the "Stock Purchase Agreement"
did not in fact reflect all of the terms and conditions of the
transfer, but that a separate agreement sent to counsel was
also part and parcel of this transaction.

After months of

requests, Barrick's counsel finally identified this agreement
as the June 11 Agreement.
Gold Standard immediately moved the district court for
an order to compel production of this agreement.

In response

to Gold Standard's motion, Barrick submitted the June 11
Agreement to the district court for in camera review and argued
that the terms of the June 11 Agreement, which it would not
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describe at argument or in its moving papers, demonstrated an
entitlement to protection under the attorney-client privilege
and as attorney work-product.

The defendants, however, have

never disputed that the June 11 Agreement is part and parcel of
the sales arrangement.

The district court, in turn, held that

the June 11 Agreement was "privileged." R. at 4754.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Gold Standard specifically alleges in its Third

Amended Complaint:
(a)

That Getty, and its parent, Texaco, denied

Gold Standard's rights, including its right of first
refusal, by undertaking to sell the Mercur Mine
without affording Gold Standard the opportunity to
match the successful bid (R. at 4399);
(b)

That Texaco and Barrick structured the terms

of the sales agreement to transfer the Mercur Mine so
as to diminish Gold Standard's interest (R. at 4395);
(c)

That Barrick extracted minerals from the

Mercur Mine despite notice of Gold Standard's rights
and claims such that Barrick committed knowing
trespass and conversion (R. at 4388); and
(d)

That Barrick and Texaco conspired, in the

negotiations and agreement for the transfer of the
Mercur Mine, to:
-5-

ic

Transfer the Mercur Mine from Getty Oil

Company so as to avoid recognizing the rights of
Gold Standard, including its right of first
refusal (R. at 4385);
ii.

To keep from Gold Standard its property

interest by denying its 25% working interest and
by miscalculating its purported 15% net profit
interest (R, at 4385); and
iii. To prevent Gold Standard from asserting
its rights and to destroy Gold Standard as a
business.
2,

R* at 4385.

Barrick, in its negotiations with Texaco for the

purchase of the Mercur Mine, sought "[c]larification of the
Gold Standard claim."

Appendix "B," letters dated April 2,

1985, and April 19, 1985, Exhibits 1177 and 424, respectively.
In Barrick1s final letter offering to purchase the Mercur Mine,
however, Barrick removed any mention of a clarification of Gold
Standard's claim.

Appendix "C," letter dated April 19, 1985,

Exhibit 425.
3.

According to Barrick*s chairman, Peter Munk,

Texaco informed Barrick that it would rather take less money
but was unwilling to accept any kind of ongoing liability for
Gold Standard's claims.

See Appendix M D, M Deposition Testimony

of Peter Munk, at 384-385.
-6-

4.

Shortly before the sale of the mine, Texaco

represented to the State of Utah that the value of the mine
exceeded one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000).
Appendix "E," Application for Certificate of Authority.

The

final purchase price for the Mercur Mine, as reflected in the
"Stock Purchase Agreement," was thirty-one million dollars
($31,000,000) in cash and "a production payment in the amount
of nine million dollars ($9,000,000)."

The indemnification

provision of the "Stock Purchase Agreement," moreover, does not
cover Gold Standard's claims.

Appendix "F," May 15, 1985,

"Stock Purchase Agreement," Exhibit 426, 1f 2.3 and Schedule F.
5.

Stephen R. Dattels, one of Barrick's principal

negotiators, testified that "Barrick asked for a warranty from
Texaco with respect to Gold Standard and to be indemnified for
any breach of that warranty."

Appendix "G," November 18, 1988,

Deposition of Stephen R. Dattels, at 279.

In response to Gold

Standard's further question whether the Stock Purchase
Agreement reflected "the entire agreement between Barrick and
Texaco with respect to the acquisition of the Mercur Mine,"
Barrick's counsel instructed the deponent not to answer because
"there is an additional document that may come within the
purview of that [question] that is covered by the work product
privilege."

R. at 4273-4274, 4281.
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6.

At the completion of Mr. Dattels8 deposition,

Barrick's counsel agreed to provide Gold Standard with
foundational information with respect to the "additional
document."

On November 23, 1988, counsel for Gold Standard

sent a letter requesting that foundational information, but
received no response.

See Appendix "H," Transcript of July 13,

1989, Hearing, at 7-8.
7,

On April 12, 1989, nearly 5 months after

promising to provide this foundational information and after
Gold Standard's counsel had made several follow-up requests,
Barrick9s counsel finally disclosed that the "additional
document" that Mr. Dattels identified as part and parcel of the
entire arrangement for the transfer of the Mercur Mine, is an
agreement dated June 11, 1985.

R. at 4270-4271, 4281.

According to Barrick's privilege log, the document is addressed
to Parsons, Behle & Latimer at that time Barrick's counsel.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred when it extended the
attorney-client privilege, or the work-product doctrine, to an
agreement that the defendants admit is part and parcel of the
business transaction transferring ownership of the Mercur Mine
from Texaco to Barrick.

First, the attorney-client privilege

does not protect executed commercial agreements from
discovery.

Likewise, an executed commercial agreement does not
-8-

fall within the work-product doctrine because it is created for
a nonlitigation purpose.

Next, the defendants, who have the

burden of proof, failed to establish privilege or work-product
immunity.

Finally, the district court's decision would permit

all manner of agreements, whether lawful or not, to evade
discovery by simply Mtunneling" them to counsel.

Unless the

district court is reversed, Gold Standard may be precluded from
putting before the trier of fact the entirety of the commercial
agreement at issue in this lawsuit.

The order certainly

precludes Gold Standard from obtaining, through discovery, a
thorough understanding of the transaction and of the
defendants' motivations and purposes in entering into the
transaction.
ARGUMENT
This Court has, in effect, previously decided this
question.

In Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254

(Utah 1972), the Court rejected a claim of privilege and
protection because the information was merely "funneled" to
counsel.

Id. at 1257.

In this case, the district court has

permitted the defendants to address a commercial agreement to
counsel and then claim privilege for that agreement.

Jackson

requires the reversal of the district court.
The June 11 Agreement is at the heart of Gold
Standard's allegations that Barrick and Texaco structured the
sale of the Mercur Mine so as to destroy Gold Standard's rights
-9-

and interests and to permit Barrick to acquire the mine for a
lower price in return for accepting some risks as to Gold
Standard's claims.

The June 11 Agreement will evidence

Barrick's intent and role in structuring the sale of the Mercur
Mine.

The agreement may also contain terms of liability, risk

sharing, or indemnity—evidence Gold Standard cannot obtain
from another source.

Undoubtedly the June 11 Agreement lies at

the heart of the questions of title, property rights, breach of
fiduciary and contractual obligations, and conspiracy raised by
Gold Standard.
I.

An Agreement That Is Part and Parcel Of
A Commercial Transaction Cannot Fall
Within The Purview Of The AttorneyClient Privilege.

The attorney-client privilege does not cover an
executed commercial agreement.

The privilege only applies to

communications involving legal advice because the purpose
behind the privilege is to promote those communications between
counsel and client that enable the attorney to give more
informed legal advice.

It is to be narrowly construed and

granted only in accordance with its fundamental purpose:
The attorney-client privilege is intended to
be strictly confined within the narrowest
possible limits consistent with the logic of
its principle, and the privilege is designed
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to protect only such information a client
communicates to his attorney so that the
attorney may properly, competently and
ethically carry out his representation.
In Re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 631 F. Supp. 32, 32-33
(E.D. Wis. 1985) (citing, United States v. Weoer, 709 F.2d
1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis added).

See also

Jackson, 495 P.2d at 1257; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 403 (1976).

The June 11 Agreement was not communicated to

counsel in order to gain legal advice; rather, it is a business
document, executed in counterpart by parties on both sides of
the sale of the Mercur Mine.
Defendants could not have a legally protectable
expectation of confidentiality in executing an agreement that
was part of an arms-length commercial transaction.

A

protectable expectation of confidentiality necessarily involves
a need to divulge the communication in confidence; the mere
hope that the terms of a transaction will remain secret is not
enough.

See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389

(1981) (quoting Trammel v. .United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980) for the proposition that "the attorney-client privilege
rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all
that relates to the client's reasons for seeking
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representation.ee)

Ihe lack of a protectable expectation

shatters the claim of privilege.

Jo Gergacz, Attorney

Corporate-Client Privilege, at 3-39 (1987).
A commercial agreement, by definition, is a business
document.
advice.

The attorney-client privilege only protects legal
In order to fall within the privilege's protection, a

party must establish that "the primary purpose of submitting
the material to its attorney [is] for legal analysis and
advice."

Jackson, 495 P.2d at 1257.

See also Gergacz, at 3-31

(requiring that "the legal aspects of the communication are
dominant") (citations omitted).

Otherwise, the communication

is discoverable:
The attorney-client privilege protects
confidential disclosures made by a client to
an attorney to obtain legal advice Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976). . . . The privilege does not permit
an attorney to conduct his client's business
affairs in secret.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986),
corrected, 817 F.2d 64 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).

See also In Re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (2d Cir.),

cert, denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980) ("The

[attorney-client]

relationship itself does not create 'a cloak of protection
which is draped around all occurrences and conversations which
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have any bearing, direct or indirect, upon the relationship of
the attorney with his client.'" (citing United States v.
Goldfarb 328 F.2d 280, 281-282 (6th Cir. 1964)).

An agreement

to allocate risks or costs, to represent or warrant the merit
of claims, or to set forth consideration for the transfer of a
mine is a business document by its very nature.
Similarly, the law does not protect the "external
trappings" of the attorney-client relationship, such as the
existence of the relationship, the fees paid, "and the basic
terms of the attorney's employment."
(citations omitted).

Gergacz, at 335

See also In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803

F.2d at 496; In re Walsh, 623 F.2d at 494; Olive v. Isherwood,
Hunter & Diehm, 656 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D.V.I. 1987); Real v.
Continental Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1986);
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
§ 2017; Hellerstein, "A Comprehensive Survey of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine," Current
Problems in Federal Civil Practice (1988).
In Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D.
111. 1972), the court rejected the claim of privilege for a
retainer agreement.

In Bailey, "[p]laintiff, a former chief

operating officer and director of the Black Company, alleged
that the defendants, Meister Brau, the Black family, and the
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executors of the Black estate, conspired to breach his
contractual right to purchase the company."

Id,, at 212.

In

line with this theory, plaintiff claimed that the attorney, who
was also an officer of the Black Company, may have received the
fees from Meister Brau as "a reward for improper cooperation in
the purchase of the Black Company."

Id. at 214.

To this end,

plaintiff sought discovery of the attorney's retainer agreement
and amount of fees.

The attorney objected on the grounds that

the information sought was protected by the attorney-client
privilege.

The Bailev court held that such agreements are

usually not protected and ordered discovery of the document.
Id. at 214-15.
It is uncontroverted that the June 11 Agreement is
part and parcel of the commercial transaction that transferred
ownership of the Mercur Mine from Texaco to Barrick.

It is a

commercial agreement, negotiated by the parties at arms-length,
and signed in counterpart.

By its very nature, it does not

contain the type of communication the privilege protects.
that reason, there is no case that allows a party to hide a
commercial agreement that is part and parcel of a business
transaction by way of the attorney-client privilege.
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For

II.

The Work-Product Doctrine Does Not
Allow The Defendants To Shield A
Commercial Agreement From Discovery,

The work-product doctrine is meant to protect legal
analyses and theories, not an executed commercial agreement
written for the purpose of transferring ownership of a gold
mine.l/
The work-product doctrine is a narrow exception to the
otherwise "liberal scope of discovery."

Trail Mountain Coal

Co. v. Arco Coal Sales Co., 749 P.2d 637, 639 (Utah 1988).

It

allows a party to withhold "documents and tangible things . . .
prepared in anticipation of litigation."
P. 26(b)(3).

Utah R. Civ.

As in the case of the attorney-client privilege,

application of the work-product doctrine is limited to those
instances where its use would further its intrinsic purposes.
Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987).
The work-product doctrine only protects that material
which is created as preparation for trial or for use at trial:

i/ The district court limited its decision to finding that the
June 11 Agreement was "privileged" (R. at 4754). Both the
trial court and the defendants have treated both the
attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity as
privileges. Gold Standard, therefore addresses the
applicability of the work product doctrine to this controversy.
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Materials assembled in the ordinary course
of business, or pursuant to public
requirements unrelated to litigation, or for
other nonlitigation purposes are not under
the qualified immunity provided by this
subdivision.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Mercy v. County of

Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).

The doctrine is

intended to ensure the proper functioning of the adversary
system by creating a "zone of privacy" within which a lawyer
may conduct the preparation for trial free from intrusion by
opposing counsel.

See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11

(1947); Hellerstein, at 132.
Discovery into a commercial agreement does not affect
an attorney's preparation for trial.

While the doctrine

protects interview notes and legal memoranda, it does not
protect a document signed in counterpart by six parties that is
part and parcel of a business transaction.

III. Defendants' Naked Assertion Of
Attorney-Client Privilege And Attorney
Work-Product Does Not Satisfy Their
Burden of Proof.
The burden of proof is on the party asserting the
existence of the attorney-client privilege or the applicability
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of the work-product doctrine*

See Jackson, 495 P*2d at 1257;

Sobol v, E.P. Dutton, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Home, 100 F.R.D. 740, 747 (D.
Utah 1983).

Apart from making vague and unsubstantiated

general assertions, the only particularized offer of proof that
the defendants made below was to offer the conclusory affidavit
of Patrick J. Garver which asserted, without more, that the
Agreement contained "confidential communications" and "was
prepared in anticipation of litigation."
is a wholly inadequate showing.

R. at 4321.^

This

See, e.g., Jackson, 495 P.2d

at 1255-57 (although the defendants submitted an affidavit,
their generalization that litigation was anticipated was
legally insufficient to satisfy their burden of proof); cf.
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 541 (5th Cir.
1982), reh. denied, 688 F.2d 840, cert, denied, 466 U.S. 94
(1984) (blanket assertions of attorney-client privilege are
unacceptable as they "disable the court and the adversary party
from testing the merits of the claim of privilege").

±-' Gold Standard moved to strike Mr. Garver* s Affidavit. The
Motion to Strike was submitted for decision with the discovery
question. The District Court did not expressly rule on that
motion in deciding the discovery question.

-17-

IV«

In Effect, The District Court's Decision
Would Permit The Use Of Privilege To Cloak
All Manner Of Damaging Material.

The district court's decision would permit a party to
hide potentially damaging material by simply reducing it to
writing, stamping it "confidential," and sending it off to
counsel.

But this Court has already held that a document is

not protected merely because it was "funneled" to an attorney.
In Jackson, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant,
by "negligently allowing acid or other harmful substances to
flow in the air . . ., caused damage to the vehicles of the
various plaintiffs."

495 P.2d at 1255.

During the discovery

phase of the case, the plaintiffs propounded interrogatories to
the defendant that addressed "the existence and the location of
any records concerning the amount of acid or smelting materials
which escape during a designated period of time."

id.

The

defendant refused to answer, responding "that the record of
emissions is maintained in the legal counsel files as
privileged information collected at the request of legal
counsel."

id.

The Court rejected this claim of privilege and

held the information was discoverable:
The type of information which defendant has
compiled in the records is discoverable;
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defendant cannot foreclose the discovery
process by the simple expedient of funneling
the matter into its counsel's custody.
Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).

See also In Re Grand Jury

Testimony of Attorney X, 621 F.Supp. 590, 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(a party is not entitled to invoke the attorney-client
privilege where counsel is no more than a "mere •conduit'")
(citations omitted).
In this case, the District Court's decision threatens
to prevent Gold Standard from putting before the trier of fact
not only the purchase agreement in its entirety but that very
part of the purchase agreement that specifically addresses Gold
Standard.

In its first offer letters to Texaco, Barrick

evidenced a serious concern for Gold Standard's claims,
conditioning its bid on clarification of the claims to a
working interest and to a first right of refusal.
No. 2)

Texaco, in turn, represented that it would not accept

any ongoing liability for Gold Standard's claims.
No. 3)

(See Fact

(See Fact

Once Barrick removed all reference to Gold Standard in

its final offer letter (See Fact No. 2), Texaco agreed to sell
the mine, valued at over $100 million, to Barrick for $31
million with a potential $9 million production payment.
Fact No. 4)

(See

After the Stock Purchase Agreement was signed but
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before any money changed hands, the parties executed a separate
agreement as to Gold Standard's claims and merely funneled it
to Barrick's counsel.

Through the first two years of

discovery, the defendants refused to disclose the very
existence of this agreement.

Even after Mr. Dattels disclosed

its existence, the defendants would not identify the agreement
for nearly five months.

(See Fact Nos. 6-7)

And now the

district court has prevented Gold Standard from conducting
discovery into the defendants' decision to remove from the
offer letters any condition and to except from the indemnity of
the Stock Purchase Agreement any warranty as to Gold Standard's
claims.
Gold Standard has a right to establish that the
defendants agreed not to recognize Gold Standard's rightful
interest in the mine but rather chose to risk litigation.
Likewise, Gold Standard has a right to establish that part of
the consideration for the transfer of the mine was the
allocation of risks and costs associated with Gold Standard's
claims.

And Gold Standard has the right to establish the

defendants' intentional wrongful conduct by presenting to the
jury the June 11, 1585 Agreement.

The Court should not

frustrate the truth-finding process by allowing these
defendants to hide the commercial transaction by simply
fashioning their agreement to appear to be some privileged
communication.
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CONCLUSION
Just as the Court ordered discovery in Jackson, it
should be ordered here.

There is no basis in law or fact for

the district court to permit the defendants to use the
attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine to keep from
Gold Standard and from the trier of fact terms of a commercial
agreement that go to the heart of Gold Standard's claims.
Accordingly, Gold Standard requests this Court to reverse the
district court's decision.
DATED this

/ /

day of December, 1989.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
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By.
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i^wrie
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